FAQs

No. Parties to a meretricious relationship are not entitled to an award of maintenance or attorney's fees. 

Although the division of property following the dissolution of a meretricious relationship must be just and equitable, it need not be equal. Sutton and Widner, 85 Wash.App. at 492. If one party has considerable separate assets, the court may consider that in dividing the community property. Zion Construction, 78 Wash. App. at 91. The court has wide discretion in deciding what constitutes a just and equitable division of property. Id. at 91.

In Lindsey, the court set out several factors to be considered in determining whether a meretricious relationship exists: 1. Continuous cohabitation; 2. Duration of the relationship; 3. Purpose of the relationship; and 4. The pooling of resources and services for joint projects. Lindsey, 101 Wash.2d at 304. However, the Lindsey court emphasized that the issue of meretricious relationship should be determined by the court based on the facts of each case, and that these criteria were not a rigid set of requirements to be strictly followed. Id. at 305.

In Lindsey, the court states that upon dissolution of a meretricious relationship, a court must, "examine the [meretricious] relationship and the property accumulations and make a just and equitable disposition of the property." Lindsey, 101 Wash.2d at 304. The Lindsey court cited RCW 26.09.080 as supporting this rule by analogy. This was later interpreted in Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash.2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995), to mean that while it is appropriate to look to RCW 26.09.080 for guidance in the division of property upon dissolution of a meretricious relationship, it does not directly apply. The court in Connell stated that, "[t]he critical focus is on property that would have been characterized as community property had the parties been married." Id. at 352.

Additionally, Connell sets out a presumption that all property acquired during a meretricious relationship is subject to a rebuttable presumption of "community" ownership.

Another important interpretation was set out in Zion Construction, Inc. v. Gilmore, 78 Wash.App. 87, 895 P.2d 864 (1995). In determining how the interest in a home purchased by the parties during a meretricious relationship should be divided, the court stated, "Earnings of a spouse would traditionally be classified as community property. Therefore, by analogy expenditures on property from earned income in a quasi-marriage do not support a claim for treating property as separate rather than as a pooled asset." Id. at 90.    

The factors for determining meretricious relationships have been applied in several cases which illustrate what type of relationship rises to the level of a meretricious relationship. In In re Sutton and Widner, 85 Wash.App.487, 933 P.2d 1069 (1997), the court found a meretricious relationship to exist where the parties cohabited for five years, socialized as a couple, and worked together, but maintained separate property and banking accounts. During their relationship, they built a house together on property previously purchased by Mr. Widner. The court held that there was a meretricious relationship based on these facts, even though the couple maintained their separate identities and accounts. Id. at 90.

Additionally, in In re Hilt, 41 Wash.App. 434, 704 P.2d 672 (1985), a meretricious relationship was also found. The parties cohabited for 4 years, during which time they purchased a home, shared in the management of household affairs, and contributed to each other's separate checking accounts. The court specifically noted that the parties, "made little effort to keep their income separate and apart," and held that these facts substantiated the existence of a meretricious relationship.

The court has even found a meretricious relationship can exist between two parties when one of the parties was legally married to another during the relationship. In Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wn.App. 880, 812 P.2d 523, (Wash.App. 1991), the couple lived together approximately 10 years. They bought their first property together on Camano Island while Thilges was still married to another woman. They evidenced their mutual trust by putting the property in Foster's name because of Thilges' marital status. Foster later formally conveyed half interest in the property to Thilges. In addition, they built a home together, jointly obtained a construction loan, and both contributed considerable physical labor to the project. They also had joint bank accounts and combined their earnings. Although it is not necessary for a couple to represent themselves as husband and wife to establish a pseudomarital relationship, in at least some of their social activities, Foster and Thilges were known as husband and wife.    

If you are entering into a living together relationship, we strongly suggest:

• A Cohabitation Agreement (similar to a Prenuptial Agreement) be executed to clarify both parties' intentions/expectations.

• You strictly maintain your property/assets in your name alone if you intend to preserve its separate character.   

• Contact our office or an attorney of your choosing for further details and specific advice.

In essence, a meretricious relationship is a living together relationship. Washington state courts have defined a meretricious relationship as, "a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist." Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash.2d 339, 898 P.2d 831, (1995).